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INTRODUCTION  
 
There are two articles represented in the Working Paper. In both of them, the central 
themes are macroeconomic effects which are to be generated by the pension reform. 
 
In the first article, the effects on overall pension due to the foreseen changes in accrual rates 
and pension base are exposed. The calculations show that these effects will not decrease the 
pension significantly in 2000 but in 2015 it will decrease for at least 5%. 
 
In the second article the effects of pension reform are not aimed at overall pension but at 
some key macroeconomic aggregates, as for instance: employment, unemployment, GDP, 
investment, public debt, etc. The estimations are made with the assistance of 
macroeconomic model Hermin. 
 
Both presented articles in the Working Paper are the constituent part of the study "The 
Hermin Macromodel of Slovenia" (Inš titut za ekonomska raziskovanja, Ljubljana, 1999). 
In either case, the replemishement and enlargement have been done. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE PENSION - REFORM EFFECTS ON PENSIONS 
 
Slovenian pension system is based on intergeneration compact: the present working 
population provides pensions for existing pensioners by paying contributions on gross 
wages (PAYG system). Such a system can function up to the point when pension ratio 
(pensioners / workers) begins to accelerate. In Slovenia this happened in the period 1985-
1991 when the number of pensioners increased while that of working population decreased. 
The government solved the problem in a very simple way: contribution rate on gross wages 
was raised to maintain balance in the pension budget. The next shock for the Slovenian 
pension system happened in 1996, when the government reduced contribution rate on gross 
wages for five percentage points to reduce labour costs. (It is not clear how successful the 
measure was in stimulating higher growth of industrial pro c ion and export). However, 
the government had been forced to refund the reduced income to pension budget. The 
transfer payment from the state budget increased in 1996 by twelve percentage points, just 
to cover the budget gap. Further reduction of contribution rate in the following two years 
claimed additional transfers from the state budget (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Pension budget - revenues (in million SIT and percentage in brackets) 
 
YEAR 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Pension  
Contributions 
121,925 
(89.050) 
192,384 
(92.946) 
238,466 
(91.416) 
283,699 
(91.982) 
280,181 
(79.535) 
291,637 
(71.102) 
328,815 
(69.871) 
Other revenues 14,917 
(10.895) 
8,172 
(3.948) 
6,310 
(2.419) 
4,851 
(1.573) 
5,357 
(1.521) 
7,666 
(1.869) 
8,471 
(1.800) 
Transfers from state 
budget 
0,075 
(0.055) 
6,430 
(3.106) 
16,083 
(6.165) 
19,878 
(6.455) 
66,733 
(18.944) 
110,866 
(27.029) 
133,320 
(28.329) 
Total 136,917 
(100.00) 
206,986 
(100.00) 
260,859 
(100.00) 
308,428 
(100.00) 
352,271 
(100.00) 
410,169 
(100.00) 
470,606 
(100.00) 
 
A "real" shock in the pension system can be expected in the near future when a new pension 
reform takes place. In the initial reform proposal the establishment of a three pillar systems, 
instead of the present unified pension budget, have been foreseen. The two of them would 
be obligatory in such a way that financial means would be assured through the present 
contribution rate on gross wages. The first pillar would operate on the existing solution 
while the second one as a pure capital fund. Approximately 15% of the present contribution 
rate would be allocated to the capital fund (the second one), and so this fund would be in a 
position to invest these financial means according to its own judgement (at least 4% profit 
would be assured, if not by fund then guaranteed by government). There is no doubt that 
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the pension gap would increase, and again the government would be forced to cover the 
larger pension gap; simply because the present pension burden will be at least at the present 
level - more probably even higher. The decreasing dynamics of the worker/pensioner ratio in 
combination with pension contribution rate support the upper statement (see Table 2). That 
can be easily proved by this relationship: the percentage of workers contributions in pension 
budget (PWC) is determined by the pension contribution rate on gross wages (PCR) and by 
the ratio number of workers per pensioner (RWP). The estimated regression is: 
 
PWC = -78,795 + 45,704 RWP + 2,826 PCR 
             (-4,87)       (4,49)               (19,36) 
 
R2  =  .993  SE =  .850  DW = 2,27 
 
– Time span of estimation 1992- 8 
– PWC - percentage of workers contributions in pension budget (as % of total) 
– PCR - pension contribution rate on gross wages 
– RWP - ratio number of workers per pensioner 
– R2 - coefficient of determination 
– SE - standard error of regression 
– DW - statistics 
 
The results are plausible. Pension contribution rate has a significant influence on pension 
budget; 1 one percentage point increase of contribution rate decreases the share of state 
transfers in pension budget for 2,8 percentage points. 
 
The third pillar would operate on capital account and would be voluntary. In fact this type 
of pension fund is already in function. There are several banks and insurance companies 
which are offering favourable conditions, i.e. 4% real profit rate. 
 
                                            
1  At this point it has to be emphasised the problem of tax evasion too, referring to some groups of 
employees. It is well known that employees in small scale business nd farm rs (approx. 20% of all 
employees) contribute to a pension fund substantially less than employees in enterprises and companies. 
The standardised ratio (i.e. per employee) between two groups reaches the multiple coefficient on the 
behalf of the second group. So, it is a lot of work to be done here, just to reach the more equitable 
burdening which would at least partially reduce the deficit in pension fund (F. Kuzmin, Kmetje in 
obrtniki plaèajo premalo, Gospodarski vestnik, š t. 8, 1996) 
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Table 2. Some pension indicators 
 
YEAR 
/ 
1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of 
workers (1,000) 
945.7 924.0 877.1 841.1 825.9 822.9 830.5 823.5 821.7 823.62 
Number of pensioners 
(1,000) 
310.6 384.1 418.9 443.3 451.8 452.4 454.7 457.9 462.9 467.2 
Ratio:  
workers/pensioners 
 
3.045 
 
2.406 
 
2.094 
 
1.897 
 
1.828 
 
1.819 
 
1.826 
 
1.798 
 
1.775 
 
1.763 
Pension contribution 
rate3 on gross wage4 - % 
 
- 
 
- 
 
28.8 
 
28.8 
 
31.0 
 
31.0 
 
31.0 
 
26.5 
 
24.35 
 
24.35 
 
It seems that all the three partners (Trade Unions, government and employers) in 
negotiation on pension reform are more than aware of the difficulties and they agreed to 
abandon the second pillar (at least for some years). But in spite of it the pension reorm has 
to be carried out. And where are the problems? Let us mention four key items: 
– the length of working age or old age limit, as a criterion to receive pension, 
– the accrual rates, 
– the period which is taken into account for calculating the average wage, as a pension 
base, 
– the indexation of pensions, according to wage growth and/or consumer price index. 
 
Ad a) 
Up to now, the sufficient condition to receive full pension has been 40 years of work for 
men and 35 for women. The government's proposal on this matter is to replace the working 
age by old age limit, i.e. 65 years for men and 63 for women (if by that moment, the 
working age has been overfulfilled than the pension will be adequately higher). On the 
contrary, the Trade Union insist on unchanged working age, as the unique criterion to get 
pension .The issue of negotiation among partners is unpredictable and that is why we are 
not in position to estimate effects of government's proposal on the overall number of 
pensioners. In order to capture this and other effects of the pension reform the official 
predictions (i.e. the predictions for the total number of pensioners and new-e trants) have 
simply been taken into account. The predictions refer to the period from 2000 to 2015 
(Table 3, number of new-entrants). 
 
                                            
2  Estimate. 
3  Pension contribution rate includes employee's and employer's contributions for pensions. 
4  Gross wage includes net wage, direct tax and employee's contributions to social-security schemes. 
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Table 3. Projection of new-comers - pensioners 
 
Year of MEN WOMEN Total 
pensioning Number of 
new-entrants 
Average 
age 
Number of 
new-entrants 
Average 
age 
number 
2000 9,020 58.5 6,280 55.5 15,300 
2001 9,570 58.7 6,780 55.9 16,350 
2002 9,950 58.8 6,320 56.3 16,270 
2003 8,470 59.0 6,420 56.6 14,890 
2004 9,890 59.2 5,640 57.0 15,530 
2005 9,310 59.3 7,290 57.4 16,600 
2006 8,680 59.5 7,130 57.8 15,810 
2007 9,080 59.7 8,320 58.1 17,400 
2008 10,040 59.8 7,560 58.5 17,600 
2009 11,190 60.0 7,930 58.9 19,120 
2010 12,100 60.2 8,480 59.3 20,590 
2011 11,630 6.03 9,320 59.6 20,950 
2012 12,050 60.5 10,950 59.8 23,000 
2013 13,380 60.7 11,120 60.0 24,500 
2014 12,290 60.8 12,650 60.1 24,940 
2015 12,790 61.0 11,820 60.3 24,610 
Source: Bela knjiga o reformi pokojninskega in invalidskega zavarovanja, Ljubljana, 1997. 
 
Because of the fact that new-e trants will enter the pensioner's status under different 
conditions as those pensioned before the year 2000 we found ourselves forced to 
decompose the total number of pensioners. The decomposition was elaborated as follows: 
the surviving persons of each new-entrant’s group (i.e. pensioners entering the status in the  
particular year) in subsequent years (up to 2015) were calculating on the basis of 
corresponding ae surviving rates (different rates for men and women, and corrected when 
the retired age is not a whole number - linear interpolation). The cumulative number of all 
the surviving persons represents the number of pensioners entering the pensioner system 
from the year 2000 and later on up to 2015. By subtracting the cumulative number of new-
entrants (i.e. the sum of current new-e trants plus all surviving new-entrants from previous 
years) from the official prediction of total number we get the number of pensioners who 
have entered the pensioner system before 2000. The pensions for this group will remain 
unchanged, according to the pension conditions before 2000. The rules for all new-entrants 
(entrants in 2000 and later on) are to be changed. 
 
Table 4 presents the estimated number of all the pensioners, divided in pensioners entering 
the status before 2000 and those entering 2000 and later. 
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The results of the Table 4 show us that the percentage of new-entrants incr ases from 3.2% 
(2000) to 50.2% (2015). Of course this does not mean that 50.2% of all the pensioners in 
2015 will have equal benefits. According to pension reform the benefits (pension 
conditions) will decrease. This means that the pensioners entering the system in 2000 
(15,300 pensioners) and surviving up to 2015 (10,696) will be in a better position as those 
entering from 2001 to 2015. This problem will be elaborated in the subsequent sections. 
 
Table 4. Estimated number of pensioners 
 
Year Total number Old pensioners 
retired before 2000 
New-entrants 
retired 2000 and later 
  (96.787) (3.213) 
2000 476,236 460,936 15,300 
  (93.433) (6.567) 
2001 478,993 447,537 31,456 
  (90.156) (9.844) 
2002 480,557 433,249 47,308 
  (87.184) (12.816) 
2003 480,135 418,603 61,532 
  (84.208) (15.792) 
2004 482,218 406,067 76,151 
  (81.084) (18.916) 
2005 484,001 392,447 91,554 
  (78.165) (21.835) 
2006 484,807 378,948 105,859 
  (75.049) (24.951) 
2007 486,698 365,261 121,437 
  (72.051) (27.949) 
2008 489,670 352,812 136,858 
  (68.863) (31.137) 
2009 492,682 339,278 153,404 
  (65.654) (34.346) 
2010 497,799 326,824 170,975 
  (62.365) (37.635) 
2011 500,626 312,217 188,409 
  (59.159) (40.841) 
2012 507,749 300,381 207,368 
  (55.873) (44.127) 
2013 515,010 287,753 227,257 
  (52.587) (47.413) 
2014 520,852 273,903 246,949 
  (49.828) (50.172) 
2015 529,479 263,830 265,649 
(   ) percentage 
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Ad b) 
The current pension is calculated on the basis of net wages. The full working age (i.e. 40 for 
men and 35 for women) is a necessary and sufficient condition to receive a pension equal to 
85% of one’s best ten-y ar average wage. According to the proposal of pension reform this 
will be changed in next 30 years. The accrual rate will gradually decrease: each year the 
pension basis will be lower for 0.5% up to 70% of net wage. So the pension basis for the 
new-entrants pensioned in 2000 will be 84.5%, for those in 2001 84%, etc. 
 
On the condition that average wages of new-comers are equal to average wages of old 
pensioners (retired before 2000), than the pension of new-entrants 2000 will be decreased by 
0.588%, for those pensioned in 2001 for 1.176% and for the last group (2015) for 9.412%. 
So each new-entrant group will receive lower pensions compared to the group of previous  
years. Taking into account the upper correction factors for each new-entrant group5 and the 
unchanged pensions for the persons retired before 2000, the overall pension will be lower. 
This effect on overall pension depends on the share of old (before 2000) and new 
pensioners (2000 and later). Such a calculation is presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The effects of lowered pension base on the overall pension 
 
Year Pension base 
% of net wage 
Correction factor for 
new-entrants 
Total effect on overall 
pension 
1999 85.0 1.0 1.0 
2000 84.5 .99412 .99981 
2001 84.0 .98824 .99941 
2002 83.5 .98235 .99882 
2003 83.0 .97647 .99811 
2004 82.5 .97059 .99720 
2005 82.0 .96471 .99604 
2006 81.5 .95882 .99476 
2007 81.0 .95294 .99319 
2008 80.5 .94706 .99144 
2009 80.0 .94118 .98935 
2010 79.5 .93529 .98697 
2011 79.0 .92941 .98433 
2012 78.5 .92353 .98138 
2013 78.0 .91765 .97809 
2014 77.5 .91176 .97454 
2015 77.0 .90588 .97110 
 
                                            
5 The pension for each new-entrants group (and in subsequent years for the surviving persons from this 
group) will remain the same. 
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The results show that the effects will not be spectacular. The overall pension in 2000 will be 
lower for 0.019% and in 2015 for 2.89%.
 
Ad c) 
The actual pension base is represented by the highest average wage for ten consecutive 
years. The pension reform foresees significant changes here. Ten years' period will be 
gradually prolonged up to 25 years; each year one additional year will be added to the 
calculation of the pension base. So the pension base for the new-ent ants 2000 will  be 
weighted by average wage before pension reform (i.e. 122,876. SIT / 1300 DEM6) and by 
that one for 1999 (i.e. 100,495. SIT).7 The pension base for the new-entrants 2000 will be 
120,841. SIT or 98.344% of the highest wage which was the pension base for the 
pensioners retired before 2000. If this happens the overall average pension will be lower 
depending on the share of new-entrants in total number of  pensioners. Th  procedure of 
calculating these effects on the overall pension is identical to that one of calculating the 
effects of lowered pension base from 85% to 70% of net wages. 
 
In the Table 6 the effects of increasing period for calculation of the pension base are 
presented in four variants (separately for each new-entrant group and for all pensioners): in 
the first variant 0.5% wage increase is foreseen, in the second one 1%, etc. 
 
It seems that the effects of prolonged period on overall pension are not significantly higher 
in comparison to those ones of lowered pension base. But, nevertheless, the joint effect of 
both (i.e. the product) will lower the overall pension in 2015 for at least 5% (see Table 7).
 
                                            
6 This wage is coming out of the golden wage period 1971-1980 (prices 1988). 
7 This wage is calculated at 0.5% increase as compared to that one of 1998 (prices 1988). 
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Table 6:  The effects on the overall pension because of the increase in the relevant period for calculating pension base 
 
YEAR 0,5 wage increase 1,0% wage increase 1,5% wage increase 2% wage increase 
 Correction 
factors for 
new-entrants 
Total effects 
on overall 
pension 
Correction 
factors for 
new-entrants 
Total effects 
on overall 
pension 
Correction 
factors for 
new-entrants 
Total effect on 
overall 
pension 
Correction 
factors for 
new-entrants 
Total effects 
on overall 
pension 
1999 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
2000 .98344 .99947 .98381 .99948 .98418 .99949 .98455 .99950 
2001 .96998 .99845 .97101 .99850 .97203 .99855 .97306 .99859 
2002 .95891 .99709 .96081 .99720 .96272 .99731 .96464 .99742 
2003 .94972 .99556 .95267 .99577 .95565 .99597 .95866 .99617 
2004 .94203 .99378 .94618 .99411 .95038 .99445 .95465 .99478 
2005 .93556 .99169 .94103 .99220 .94660 .99272 .95226 .99324 
2006 .93009 .98955 .93700 .99028 .94404 .99102 .95123 .99177 
2007 .92547 .98710 .93390 .98811 .94253 .98915 .95136 .99020 
2008 .92157 .98458 .93159 .98593 .94189 .98731 .95247 .98872 
2009 .91826 .98177 .92996 .98354 .94202 .98536 .95445 .98722 
2010 .91547 .97879 .92891 .98107 .94281 .98342 .95718 .98582 
2011 .91313 .97568 .92837 .97855 .94418 .98150 .96059 .98453 
2012 .91118 .97247 .92827 .97602 .94607 .97969 .96459 .98346 
2013 .90958 .96912 .92857 .97346 .94841 .97794 .96914 .98258 
2014 .90827 .96572 .92922 .97097 .95117 .97633 .97419 .98193 
2015 .91081 .96288 .93451 .96900 .95944 .97537 .98567 .98199 
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Table 7.  Total effects of a decrease in pension base and the increased relevant period for 
calculating pension base on overall pension 
 
 TOTAL EFFECTS AT: 
YEAR 0.5% 
wage increase 
1.0% 
wage increase 
1.5% 
wage increase 
2.0% 
wage increase 
1999 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2000 0.999280 0.999290 0.999300 0.999310 
2001 0.997861 0.997911 0.997961 0.998001 
2002 0.995913 0.996023 0.996133 0.996243 
2003 0.993678 0.993888 0.994088 0.994287 
2004 0.990997 0.991327 0.991666 0.991995 
2005 0.987763 0.988271 0.988789 0.989307 
2006 0.984365 0.985091 0.985827 0.986573 
2007 0.980378 0.981381 0.982414 0.983457 
2008 0.976152 0.977490 0.978859 0.980257 
2009 0.971304 0.973055 0.974856 0.976696 
2010 0.966036 0.968287 0.970606 0.972975 
2011 0.960391 0.963216 0.966120 0.969102 
2012 0.954363 0.957846 0.961448 0.965148 
2013 0.947887 0.952132 0.956513 0.9611052 
2014 0.941133 0.946249 0.951473 0.956930 
2015 0.935053 0.940996 0.947182 0.953610 
 
 
Ad d) 
Up to the present the indexation of pensions was based on wage movement and consumer 
price index. Each month the pensions have been fully adjusted by wage or consumer price 
index. 
 
Since the agreement on pension reform among social partners is still under the way we will 
examine one of the hypothetical solution - the solution with incomplete adaptation. Such a 
solution could go along the following lines: the pensions are adapted with wages, not every 
month but each third month. So the pensions are unchanged for two months and in the third 
one they are adapted at the level of three months' wage increase. In the fourth and fifth 
month the pensions are again constant, this time at the level of the third month. The pension 
of the sixth month captures the increase of wages again, and so forth. It is evident that 
under such circumstances the pensioners are deprived of two months' increase in each 
quarter. Let us put the above solution in mathematical form.  
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If complete adaptation is used than the total sum (yearly) will be: 
 
P × i + P × i2 + × × × P × i12 = P 
i i
i
× -
-
( )12 1
1
 
 
If incomplete adaptation is used than the total sum will be: 
 
P + P + P × i3 + P × i3 + P × i3 + P × i6 + × × × + P × i9 + P × i12 = P (2 + 3 i3 + 3 i6 + 3 i9 + i12) 
 
P = initial pension 
i = wage factor (1 + wage increase/monthly) 
 
Comparing both sums we get the correction factor. This factor represents the effects of 
incomplete pension adaptation on overall pension. In the Table 8 we quote some examples, 
where different wage increases are used. 
 
Table 8. The effects of incomplete indexation on overall pension 
 
Wage factor - yearly level Correction factor on overall pension 
1.02 .9983641 
1.04 .9967016 
1.06 .9951612 
1.08 .9936297 
1.10 .9921259 
1.12 .9906602 
 
 
The effects of incomplete indexation on overall pension are pretty modest; a 12% wage 
increase would lower the average pension not more than for 1%. Anyhow this practically 
means that the pension budget would be decreased by 3.5 millions DM per year. 
 
Similar calculation can be made when adaptation is based on consumer price index. 
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ESTIMATION OF SOME MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE PENSION 
REFORM IN SLOVENIA  
 
In this paper the HERMIN model8 is used to simulate the effects brought about by the 
planned pension reform in Slovenia. There exist several distinct variants of the reform to be 
carried out in Slovenia; in fact, the debate is still going on as to what is acceptable and what 
not, involving all of the social partners. So let us focus on proposals contained in the Wh te 
Book (1997), the second pillar (mandatory insurance through private pension funds) 
excepted, for it will not be put into practice. It is not our ambition here to bring in detailed, 
actuarial evaluations, but rather to have a look at potential impact the reform is likely to 
have on vital economic policy targets, such as growth, employment, inflation... (absent in 
actuarial breakdowns). 
 
Problems that Slovenia9 (and, indeed, many other countries) is/are facing due to the existing 
pension system may primarily be explained as a consequence of unfavourable demographic 
developments. Below is a table illustrating the contribution rates levied on gross employee 
wages in Germany as opposed to Slovenia.  
 
Table 1. PAYG10 Contribution Rates System – Germany vs. Slovenia (in % of gross wages) 
 
YEAR  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Germany 10.0 14.0 17.0 18.0 18.7     18.6 19.2 20.3  
Slovenia      23.6 23.6 24.9 24.9 24.9 22.1 20.5 20.5 
Source: Siebert and our own re-calculations 
 
Data applying to Germany make it clear to what an extent the pension-contributions burden 
on wages has increased during the last 40-50 years. Because of the political and economic 
shift made in 1991 there are no data available for Slovenia that could compare with those 
for Germany in the preceding period. In the last six years contribution rates have been 
reduced in order to alleviate some of the burden on wages and labour cost. Consequently 
the Pension Fund found itself in red figures and the deficit had to be financed from the 
budget (some other taxes had to be re-allocat d).  
 
                                            
8  A detailed structure of the HERMIN type of models is presented in Bradley, Herce and Modesto 
(1995). The HERMIN model of the Slovenian economy is elaborated in Simonèiè, Kuzmin, Pfajfar and 
Potoènik (1999). 
9  For an explanation of past developments and future prospects of the pension system in Slovenia see the 
paper by Stanovnik and Kukar (1995). 
10  “Pay-As-You-Go” system: pension payouts based on current insuree contributions. 
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Amongst other factors, demographic growth has the strongest impact on pension 
contributions to be paid. It is a fact that in 1991 Slovenia had a 11.3%-odd share of its 
inhabitants aged 65; expected to go up to 13.6% in the year 2000 and 15.9% in 2005. 
Unfortunately, the situation in Slovenia became critical regardless of – or in addition to – 
the demographic aspect just pointed out. Table 2 shows the rising trend of pensions:  
 
Table 2. Number of pensions (in thousand) 
 
YEAR  1981 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
No. 272.7 310.6 321.0 332.5 348.0 365.1 384.1 418.9 448.8 459.3 460.0 462.3 465.4 
Ref.: White Book, p. 28 
 
We may observe that from 1991 to 1992 the number of payed out pensions rose by more 
than 30, 000, thus making the average age of Slovene pensioners11 be: 
· 65 years and 2 months (in the category of those retired due to age) 
· 60 years and 2 months (retired handicapped) 
 
Moreover, let us state that there were in 1996 (see White Book, 1997) 465,420 pensioners 
(out of which 262,142 old age pensioners, 96,850 invalidity pensioners, 83,113 survivor 
pensioners, 15,803 farmer pensioners, 4,838 military pensioners and 574 temporary 
pensioners) as opposed to a total of 763,348 insurees-active population paying pension 
contributions (out of which 581,651 employed in various companies and organisations, 
53,835 employed by private entrepreneurs, tc.). In other words: one pensioner has to be 
supported by 1.6 employees (i.e. insurees). In some well-developed countries a prognosis 
has been made that when one pensioner will have to be supported (through contributions) 
by only two employees (Economist, 1996), the existing pension system's crisis will 
culminate, presumably around 2030; which makes us believe that in Slovenia the crisis has 
already broken out.  
 
To illustrate what was going on during the last ten years – when retirement was often used 
also as a social policy tool – let us offer some data concerning the retired elderly people. By 
having a look at Table 3 it becomes obvious that, in the aforementioned category, the age of 
retirement fell down sharply in 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993; old age pensioners of male sex 
in this period are in between 56 in 58 years old, whereas those of female sex are from 52 to 
55 years old. In these years, when the average age of retirement was lowest ever, more than 
45,000 insurees retired annually - as compared with an average 20,000 
                                            
11  June 1998 data, Statistics of the National Pension Administration 
 16
throughout the years before the period stated. Pensioning was obviously used to solve 
unemployment problems too. As we have already pointed out demographic problems will be 
even more sensitive after 2005. 
 
Table 3. Age of retirement for old age pensioners 
 
 TYPE  
 PENSION. 
YEAR  
MEN- 
ACTUAL 
AGE 
MEN - 
MIN . LEGAL AGE  
 – YRS OF SERVICE 
MEN - 
MIN . LEGAL AGE  
 - 
INCOMPL . 
SERVICE  
WOMEN - 
ACTUAL 
AGE 
WOMEN - 
MIN . LEGAL AGE 
- YRS OF 
SERVICE  
WOMEN - 
MIN . AGE - 
INCOMPL . 
SERVICE  
1988 58.3  60.0 55.0  55.0 
1989 58.3  60.0 55.2  55.0 
1990 57.7  60.0 53.6  55.0 
1991 56.1  60.0 52.3  55.0 
1992 56.2 55.0 60.5 52.5 50.0 55.5 
1993 56.2 55.5 61.0 53.3 50.5 56.0 
1994 57.6 56.0 61.5 53.2 51.0 56.5 
1995 57.5 56.5 62.0 53.1 51.5 57.0 
1996 57.5 57.0 62.5 54.0 52.0 57.5 
1997 57.5 57.5 63.0 54.0 52.5 58.0 
Ref.: White Book, p. 27 
 
Table 4 presents a few main characteristics of the OECD state pension systems.  
 
Table 4. Main characteristics of OECD state pensions 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY  
NORMAL AGE 
AT 
RETIREMENT  
WOMEN / MEN 
YEARS 
REQUIRED 
FOR FULL 
PENSION 
WAGE TAX 
FOR PENSION 
(EMPLOYEES 
AND 
EMPLOYERS )  
PENSION 
INDEXATION 
LINKS:  
PENSION  
TYPE 12 
Australia 60 / 65 0 - Prices MT 
Austria 60 / 65 15 22.9 Wages CR 
Great Britain 60 / 65 40 18.8 Prices CR 
Canada 65 / 65 1 4.6 Prices UF-MT-CR 
France 60 / 60 37.5 19.8 Wages CR 
Germany 65 / 65 5 17.8 net wages CR 
Ireland 65 / 65 3 17.7 na ??? CR-MT 
Italy 55 / 60 15 26.2 Prices & wages CR 
Japan 65 / 65 25 16.9 Prices CR 
Netherlands 65 / 65 49 15.2 Wages CR 
Spain 65 / 65 15 16.7 Prices & wages CR 
Sweden 65 / 65 3 21.0 Prices CR-UF 
USA 65 / 65 10 12.4 Prices CR 
Ref.: OECD (quoted from Economist, Jan. 1996) 
 
                                            
12  CR - Contribution related; MT - Means tested; UF - Universal flat 
 17
Gross wage levies are much like those in Slovenia and Germany, but a few exceptions are to 
be noted, especially Canada and the States, both having a relatively young population.  
 
It also holds as a rule that the share of public expenditure for pensions in GDP is highest in 
the countries where wages are most burdened (see table above). So in 1995 this share in 
Austria and Italy exceeded 14%, and equalled more than 10% in Germany and France; the 
countries where the adequate share was 6% or less include USA, Ireland, Japan, Canada 
and Australia (see Economist, 1996). Comparable data applying to Slovenia may be found 
in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Share of pension & disablement payments13 in GDP (in %) 
 
YEAR  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
SHARE 7.17 8.49 9.06 8.20 10.23 11.53 10.75 12.48 12.98 13.42 13.61 13.60 13.77 
Ref.: White Book, p. 59 
 
Table 5 makes it clear that the share of paid-out ensions in GDP in Slovenia has increased 
close to 14%, thus catching up with the figures in Austria and Italy.  
 
Social security contributions act much like the labour tax. Any increase of these 
contributions results in an increase of labour cost and, on the other hand, decrease of net 
wage per employee. Increased labour costs are thus tax-w dged. An increase in wage tax 
(difference between gross and net pay made bigger) lessens the possibility for employees 
(unions) – through negotiations with employers – to be able to accept a (too) small increase 
of gross wages. Reasonably enough, employees act in favour of not having their take- ome 
wages cut down. But, since increased taxes may result in an increase in labour cost higher 
than the one in labour productivity, demand for labour may, as a result, decrease. Thus 
increased social security levies contribute to growing unemployment and decreased growth 
of GDP. Hereafter we will try to explain the impact of it all within the existing HERMIN 
model of Slovene economy.  
 
We will analyse the pension reform in the following five steps: 
 
(1) For the basic trajectory14 we present relevant results, especially the public debt 
development and the (indirect) contribution of the pension fund deficit to public debt. 
                                            
13  Pensioners' health insurance and some other minor contributions are not taken into account.
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(2) Simulation results of the HERMIN model are presented that take into account the 
pension reform effects, i.e.: 
- projected growth of the number of pensioners 
- projected growth of the average pension 
 
(3) After ascertaining that public debt increase resulting from step (2) is unacceptable, we 
define public debt ratio (share of public debt in gross national product) which is 
considered as feasible. The direct tax rate RGTYP is computed that results from 
exogenising the public debt development. 
 
(4) In addition to changes taken into account under (3) we decreased the average pension 
rate by 20 %. 
 
(5) Steps (1)-(4) take into account indexation of pensions by gross wage rate. Indexation 
based on price development is more frequent in OECD countries (see Table 4) and less 
favourable for pensioners. We present simulation results comparable to those from the 
step (4) but with pensions indexed by private consumption deflator. 
 
Each step is presented in a separate section. Definition of a public debt ratio that is 
considered feasible and a decrease of the average pension rate by 20 % have been chosen to 
illustrate eventual macroeconomic consequences. More work should be devoted to finding 
an acceptable public debt ratio and indexation of pensions should pr bably be based on a 
combination of price and wage indices. 
 
 
 1. Some results for the basic trajectory 
 
In Table 6 we present some results that shed some light on the pension fund deficit's 
contribution to public debt. 
 
                                                                                                                              
14  Basic trajectory is characterised by an extrapolation of trends for exogenous variables of the model. For 
a deeper elaboration see Paragraph 6 of the Final Report on the Hermin model (see Simonèiè et al, 
1999). 
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Table 6. Some results for the basic trajectory 
 
YEAR 
VARIABLE 15 
1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Share of GTRSW 
 in GDPFCV 
17.7 18.2 25.9 28.9 32.4 
Share of pensions  
in GDPFCV 
14.5 15.0 22.6 25.5 28.8 
Share of pension  
contributions in GDPFCV 
13.0 13.0 13.2 13.4 13.8 
Deficit of the  
pension fund 
1.5 2.0 9.4 12.1 15.0 
Cummulative deficit  
from 1993 
1.5 6.9 40.5 95.6 164.8 
Public debt share  
in GNPV16 
27.0 37.6 66.7 129.6 229.8 
Old-age  
dependency ratio 
34.0 34.8 51.6 56.4 61.6 
 
From Table 6 we can observe the following facts: 
· the share of social transfers (GTRSW) in gross domestic product has grown from 17.7 
% in 1997 to 32 % in 2015  
· the share of pensions in GDPFCV has grown from 14.5 % in 1997 to 28.8 % in 2015
· the share of contributions by insurees for pensions is almost constant, in between 13 and 
14 % of GDPFCV 
· deficit of the pension system as share in GDPFCV has grown from 1.5% in 1997 to 
15% in 2015 and the corresponding cumulative debt in 2015 equals 165% of GDPFCV  
· the cumulative public debt caused by pension fund deficit accounts for a large part of 
the total public debt  
 
The basic trajectory reveals that with the existing pension system public debt would further 
be increased. The main causes for this situation are ageing of the Slovenian population and a 
generous pension system. 
 
 2. Simulation of the proposed pension reform 
 
The pension reform in Slovenia is expected to rely on two pillars, the first one mandatory – 
ensuring a pension to each insuree –, and the second one optional – through investments in 
                                            
15  GTRSW denotes social welfare transfers, GDPFCV stands for gross domestic product at factor cost and 
GNPV for gross national product.  
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competing private funds. To summarise, the main changes introduced by the envisaged 
pension reform are as follows:  
 
· gradual increase in number of years relevant for calculation of pension base,  
· gradual increase of minimum age at retirement, 
· reduction of the actual rates.  
 
The expected changes are given in more detail by Kuzmin (see the other part of the 
Working Paper), where some actuarial breakdowns are also included. For our purpose it is 
enough here to present the summarised effect (see Table 7), resulting from the impact of 
envisaged changes on average pension. The change is represented as a coefficient; now take 
this coefficient to multiply with it the existing (1999) pension. This coefficient is based on 
the presumption that the growth of average net wage per employee in the period under 
discussion will equal 1.5%. Ratio of the number of pensioners to the total number of older 
people is also presented in Table 7. Its value is decreased if compared to the value 
corresponding to the basic trajectory. The number of pensioners is derived from the current 
situation, the envisaged reform and the existing demographic picture. Let us add that we 
have not – explicitly – taken into account the migration flows, implicitly included in the 
projection of population growth.  
 
Table 7. Effects of the pension reform on the average pension rate and the ratio of the number 
of pensioners to the total number of older people 
 
YEAR CORRECTION 
COEFFICIENT FOR THE 
AVERAGE PENSION RATE 
RATIO OF THE NUMBER 
OF PENSIONERS TO THE 
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
ELDER PEOPLE 
1997 1.0 1.828 
2000 0.999 1.737 
2005 0.989 1.611 
2010 0.971 1.529 
2015 0.947 1.511 
 
In Table 8 we present simulation results based on these changes incorporated into data that 
defines the basic trajectory.  
 
                                                                                                                              
16  There is only small difference between GDPFCV and GNPV for Slovenia. 
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Table 8. Simulation results based on pension reform measures 
 
YEAR 
VARIABLE 
1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Growth rate for GDPFC 2.3 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.5 
Growth rate for CONS 3.7 1.7 1.3 -0.5 -0.4 
Growth rate for I 9.6 7.5 1.7 0.6 0.9 
Growth rate for L 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 
Unemployment rate 7.7 7.7 6.1 6.1 5.3 
Public debt ratio (RDEBT) 27.0 37.3 64.1 119.6 205.3 
 
The main difference - as a result of the basic trajectory - is a lower public debt total. But 
this decrease is not sufficient and reveals the need for some additional measures. 
 
 3. Simulation results based on exogenously determined values for the total public 
debt ratio 
 
This section offers an idea on what are the changes necessary in direct tax rate (RGTYP) if 
we want to decrease the ratio of the total public debt to the gross domestic product. In 
terms of the basic trajectory this debt will have risen up to 230 % of GDP untill 2015; if, 
however, the pension reform measures are enacted it will have risen up to 205 % of 
GDPFCV. For illustration purposes we have defined a trajectory for th  tal public debt 
ratio that ends with approximately 70 % of GDPFCV in 2015. The corresponding 
simulation results are presented in Table 9. Variables proceeded by PDIF are given in 
percentage difference to the trajectory values defined in Section 2 (with pension reform 
measures taken into account). 
 
Table 9. Exogenous public debt ratio simulation results 
 
YEAR 
VARIABLE 17 
1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 
RDEBT 26.6 32.9 45.6 62.3 72.5 
RGTYP 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.67 0.74 
PDIF(GDPFC) -0.5 -1.8 -3.8 -10.0 -12.7 
PDIF(CONS) -1.2 -5.4 -11.1 -29.6 -38.1 
PDIF(I) -0.4 -2.0 -4.3 -12.3 -16.6 
PDIF(L) -0.4 -1.7 -3.6 -9.6 -12.3 
UR 8.1 9.3 9.5 15.1 17.0 
 
                                            
17  Household consumption is denoted by CONS, investment by I, total number of employees by L and 
unemployment rate by UR. 
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Table 9 shows that the total public debt ratio has decreased significantly. In the period untill 
2015 it will only reach 72.5 %. But the corresponding increase in direct tax rate RGTYP 
(by feedback rule devised by Bryant and Zhang (1994)) ranges from 0.40 in 1997 to 0.74 in 
the year 2015. An increase in RGTYP causes a proportionate increase in wages. Increased 
wages are expected o bring about a deteriorated position in terms of competitiveness and a 
lower growth of value added in the manufacturing sector. It will also result in labour factor 
becoming more expensive as compared with capital; likely to introduce substitution of 
labour by capital and an increase in unemployment rate. All these effects are obvious from 
Table 9.  
 
 4. Simulation results based on a 20 per cent decrease in average pension rate 
 
One of the most direct measures aimed at relieving the wage tax burden is to reduce 
average pensions in comparison with average wages. This share is relatively high for 
Slovenia (see Table 10) as compared to some other (see Table 11). 
 
Table 10. Ratio average pension / average wage (all net; Slovenia; in %) 
 
YEAR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 199818 
Share 67.0 69.6 67.1 68.4 69.2 67.6 67.3 68.1 
Ref.: re-calculations. 
 
Table 11. Average net wages vs. average old age pension ratio in countries compared19 
 
 
COUNTRY 
AVERAGE 
NET WAGES 
(IN DEM) 
AVERAGE (STATE-
PAID) 
OLD AGE PENSION  
(IN DEM) 
RATIO OLD AGE 
PENSION / WAGE 
Slovenia 728 509 69.9 
Czech Rep. 389 187 48.1 
Hungary 476 198 41.6 
Macedonia 313 200 64.1 
Poland 342 210 61.4 
Germany 2680 1900 70.9 
Croatia 352 213 60.6 
Austria 2104 1473 70 
Ref.: White Book, 1997 
                                            
18  Taking into account the first ten months’ average. 
19  The difference in shares from Table 10 and Table 11 – Slovenia – is due to the fact that Table 
10 includes all of the pensions, while Table 11 old age pensions alone.  
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Average pensions in Slovenia amount to some 70% of (net) wages, indexation being linked 
to the growth of wages (not prices). The ratio of the average pension and the average wage 
is considerably higher than in other former socialist countries. Let us mention here that the 
aforementioned ratio amounting to 48.1% – in the Czech Republic in 1996 – i.e. decreased 
by 15 percentage points in the years from 1991 to 1996. A desirable option in our case 
would therefore be to have the ratio brought down to a similar figure. But this is a very 
sensitive political problem and such a solution is quite unlikely, for the time being, given the 
current political situation in Slovenia.  
 
Based on data from the Table 11 we will test a scenario whereby the average pension (in 
constant prices) will be reduced to 80% of the current amount. That results in a ratio of 
average pension and average net wage in the starting year 1997 being, roughly, 0.55. The 
results of such a simulation are given in Table 12. Here we can note a growth of the share 
of total public debt in GNP from 26% in 1997 to 72.6% in 2015. The required increase in 
direct RGTYP taxation has thus become lower (0.40 in 1997, and 0.65 in 2015) but not 
enough. The impact on other variables' values has also been reduced. We can therefore 
conclude that even a 20 per cent reduction of the average pension (in real terms) is not big 
enough to sufficiently relieve the pension burden on the economy. 
 
Table 12. Simulation results – a decrease of 20 % in average pension rate 
 
YEAR 
VARIABLE 
1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 
RDEBT  26.3 31.3 46.4 63.8 72.6 
RGTYP 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.60 0.65 
PDIF(GDPFC) -1.5 -1.4 -2.7 -9.3 -11.5 
PDIF(CONS) -5.1 -5.0 -9.1 -28.6 -35.9 
PDIF(I) -2.0 -2.5 -4.3 -12.6 -16.3 
PDIF(L) -1.4 -1.2 -2.5 -8.9 -11.2 
UR 9.0 8.9  8.5 14.5 15.9 
 
 5. Simulation results for pension rates indexed by private consumption deflator 
 
It is worth underlining that – regardless of the two-pillar system reform – there will remain 
the problem of the existing pensioners and people still active but for whom one should have 
to pay contributions under the new system for the years of service already gone by (to make 
up for the difference, on terms of the new system). In fact this is public debt of the state, 
either implicit (if not acknowledged) or explicit (if acknowledged, e.g. in the form of 
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government recognition bonds). In the case of the Chilean reform (s e Edwards, 1996), 
carried out in 1981 and serving as a kind of a pension-reform model in the 90’s world- ide, 
the corresponding public debt amounted to as much as 80% of GDP. A rough (restrictive) 
estimation shows that in Slovenia public debt on account of existing pensioners is higher 
than 200% of GDP, not to mention the remaining part of debt on account of contributions 
already paid by workers still ac ive.  
 
All said, it is as yet not clear how – through the reform as envisaged – the national economy 
will be relieved. As we see it, it could be achieved by the following: 
 
· a substantially lessened re-distributive role of the pension system, meaning that 
employees with low earnings would receive minimum pensions, and – in turn – the 
average pension would decrease (in fairly distant future),  
· only a limited portion of population would decide to invest (save) in the second, 
optional pillar, which – again – would result in lower average pensions (distant future),  
· reduced pensions – in real terms – because of a prolonged term of service, serving as a 
basis to calculate the average pay, and then the pension (i.e. reduction of the 
corresponding coefficient of linking),  
· increased age limit of retirement (regardless of the length of service), which – as a result 
- would bring down the average term of receiving pension,  
· and, finally, pensions of current pensioners reduced through linking pensions (mostly) to 
the price indexation, assuming that the growth of wages will be faster than that of 
prices.  
 
All of the potential effects of pension reform are expected to be felt – in erms of wage tax 
reliefs – in a quite distant future. This is, no doubt, important because demographic 
circumstance are likely to get worse. However, something should be done in the short run 
as well. 
 
One of the options would be to convert the current liabilities – involv ng the pensioners and 
persons still active – to public debt. In our view that would be a good thing to do for 
several reasons:  
· making the situation more transparent before the new pension scheme is enacted,  
· making the state behave more rationally in borrowing money, issuing various guaranties, 
privatising state property and more, all due to the considerably increased (acknowledged 
or unacknowledged) public debt.  
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As a matter of fact, the above-mentioned option would have worked better a few years ago. 
In the years following Independence the state sold off the social housing stock at 
extraordinarily low prices20. Had these prices been set higher, and sale realised through 
instalments (see Kuzmin, Stanovnik, 1994), money thus earned could have been used to 
finance public debt on account of the pension reform. In the meantime, the public debt has 
increased significantly, mainly because of the liabilities on account of former Yugoslav – 
succession - debts. Transport infrastructure investments also account for a large part of this 
increase. A great deal of guaranties have in addition been issued for private debt, quite likely 
to become part of debt to be paid off by the state. The privatisation process itself (has) 
offered quite a few opportunities to sell off property and thus take hold of a major part of 
money thus earned to finance public debt due to the pension reform21. Frequent argument 
against such a solution is that financial markets in Slovenia are very rudimentary. But it can 
be expected that this would also act as a stimulus for a faster development of modern 
financial markets. 
 
One of the possibilities to ease the burden of pensions for working population is to use price 
deflators (and not wage growth rate) as indexing mechanism. In Table 13 simulation results 
based on assumption that pension rates are indexed to private consumption deflator are 
presented.  
 
Table 13. Simulation results – pension rate indexed to private consumption deflator 
 
YEAR 
VARIABLE 
1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 
RDEBT 26.2 30.4 43.3 59.3 67.7 
RGTYP 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.50 0.55 
PDIF(GDPFC) -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 -5.4 -7.3 
PDIF(CONS) -4.9 -3.7 -2.4 -17.6 -24.3 
PDIF(I) -1.9 -1.9 -1.6 -7.4 -10.4 
PDIF(L) -1.3 -0.8 -0.5 -5.2 -7.0 
UR 9.1 9.1 8.3 13.2 15.1 
 
 
                                            
20  200,000 'social' – i.e. state-owned - flats. The average selling price equalled about 200 DEM / sq.metre. 
Had these flats been sold in instalments (over 20-30 let) at, say, 1500 DEM / m2 (a price still 
favourable), that would enable the State to earn some 16 billion (!) German marks. 
21  Assets of the Capital Fund of Pension Insurance, established in the process of privatisation, based on 
mandatory transfer of a 10% share of social (i.e. approximately state) capital within companies, 
amounting to (merely) some 1.3 billion DEM in 1998, towards the end of the year.  
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If we compare results in Table 13 to those in Table 12 we observe that direct tax rate is 
decreased significantly and that the total public debt ratio rises to less than 70 per cent of 
GNPV in 2015. Influence on gross domestic product (GDPFC), private consumption 
(CONS), investment (I) and employment (L) is also less severe than in other alternatives. 
 
 6. Conclusion 
 
We have pointed out that pension reform in Slovenia is an urgent matter. The measures of 
the proposed pension reform are of a gradual nature, expected to act in a fairly distant 
future. The effects of this reform – especially in terms of wage tax reliefs - will be quite 
modest. A number of opportunities have been missed that could make the reform more 
rational and effective (selling off state-owned flats, privatisation of social property...). Some 
positive effects (such as smaller growth of public debt, smaller wage tax burden) could be 
achieved by a fall in the average pension / average net wage ratio - from existing 0.7 to 0.55 
- but this brings about a number of negative effects as well (smaller growth of employment, 
GDP, disposable income of households, private consumption...). Some positive effects 
could also be achieved by indexing pensions to price development and not to gross wage 
growth. 
 
There is no doubt that a reform of the Slovenian pension system is necessary. The effects 
estimated by the HERMIN model simulations (mainly those presented by the radical 
alternative from Paragraph 5) show that structural disequilibria are smaller if compared to 
the present situation. Ex-ante simulations of the model have also brougt about many other 
disequilibria, such as unemployment, low investment, wages, consumption, etc. These 
problems should be tackled with other instruments of economic policy.  
 
The aim of the paper is not to present alternative measures of the pension reform but only to 
give some consequ nces of possible measures for macroeconomic development. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE PENSION - REFORM EFFECTS ON OVERALL PENSION  
 
Summary 
 
Slovenian pension reform exposes the following three major problems: 
 
– Working age or old age limit as a criterion to receive old age pension 
– Accrual rates 
– Calculation of pension base  
 
All foreseen changes will be in force only for new-entrants, entering the pension system after the year 
2000. The old pensioners, retired before 2000, will have their pensions unchanged. In such 
circumstances, the effects of all changes on overall pension depend on the share of new-entrants in
total number of pensioners. The calculations show that these effects will not decrease the overall 
pension significantly in 2000 but in 2015 it will decrease for at least 5%. 
 
 
 
ESTIMATION OF SOME MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE PENSION 
REFORM IN SLOVENIA  
 
Summary 
 
The proposed measures of the Pension reform in Slovenia are tested with a macroeconomic 
model of the HERMIN type. It was found that they don't cause really significant effects on 
macroeconomic development. To illustrate what would be needed if a real impact is 
intended, some more drastic changes are introduced and tested. 
 
